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We estimate an ordered probit model in order to explain the occurrence and magnitude of producer 
price changes in the French manufacturing sector. We use data consisting essentially of the Banque de 
France monthly business surveys, pooled over the years 1998-2005. Our results show that changes in 
the price of intermediate inputs are the main driver of producer price changes. Firms also appear to 
react significantly to changes in the producer price index of their industry. Variations in labor costs as 
well as in the production level also appear to increase the likelihood of a price change but their 
influence seems to be of a lesser importance. We also show that estimating an unconstrained dynamic 
model allows improving the estimation results as compared to those associated with a standard state-
dependent model. Finally, our results point to an asymmetry in price adjustments. When they face a 
change in their costs, firms adjust their prices upward more often and more rapidly than they do it 
downward.  
     
Keywords: Price stickiness, frequency of price changes, price setting-behavior, survey data, ordered 
probit model.  
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 Nous estimons un modèle probit ordonné afin d'expliquer la fréquence et l'amplitude des changements 
de prix à la production dans l'industrie française. Les données utilisées sont essentiellement constituées 
des enquêtes mensuelles de conjoncture de la Banque de France, empilées sur les années 1998-2005. 
    Nos résultats montrent que ce sont les changements de prix des consommations intermédiaires qui 
sont le principal déterminant des changements de prix à la production. Les firmes semblent aussi 
réagir de façon significative aux changements de l'indice des prix à la production de leur industrie. Les 
variations du coût de travail ainsi que les variations de la production semblent aussi accroitre la 
probabilité d'un changement de prix, bien que leur influence soit plus faible. Nous montrons aussi que 
l'estimation d'un modèle dynamique non contraint permet d'améliorer les résultats par rapport à ceux 
obtenus en estimant un modèle state-dependent standard. Enfin, nos résultats montrent une asymétrie 
dans l'ajustement des prix : lorsque les firmes font face à des changements de coûts, elles s'ajustent 
plus souvent et plus rapidement à la hausse qu'à la baisse. 
     
Mots clés : Viscosité des prix, fréquence de changement de prix, formation des prix, données 
d'enquête, modèle probit ordonné. 
     










 Non technical summary: 
 
 
    In recent years, a number of papers have provided a thorough description of the frequency of price 
changes and of the duration of price spells, both for consumer and producer prices. However, we have 
much less elements to assess, at the micro level, the importance of the discrepancy between these price 
variations and those we would expect if prices were fully flexible, given the frequency and magnitude 
of changes in the firms economic environment (mainly costs and demand or production changes).   
        We propose an empirical analysis of the impact, at the micro level, of changes in the firms' 
environment on their price decisions. Our data show that most changes in the firms' environment do 
not induce a price change. The probability of observing a price variation given that the firm 
environment has changed is only 21%. This shows the existence of some price rigidity as fully flexible 
prices should adjust to the variations in costs and/or demand that firms experience. For modelling this 
pricing behavior, we specify and estimate an ordered probit model using a sample of 2,401 firms from 
the French manufacturing sector that we observe monthly between October 1998 and December 2005. 
Besides their monthly periodicity, a distinctive feature of the data we use is the merging we have been 
able to make with another firm-level survey about labor costs run by the French Ministry of Labor. We 
are then in position to assess in a quite detailed manner the impact on prices of the variations of 
intermediate input prices, of wages, of the firm production level as well as that of the producer price 
inflation at the NACE-2-digit level.   
 
        The model we consider is a quite simple state-dependent pricing model, close in spirit to that 
proposed by Cecchetti (1986). Firms are assumed to possibly adjust their price in reaction to changes 
in their input costs or in their production. However, they do not necessarily proceed to such changes as 
they may find it too costly to frequently adjust their prices. In this model, the main driver of price 
changes is the discrepancy between the optimal (frictionless) price at time t and the effective price at 
time t-1. The desired price change, which corresponds to the variation of the optimal price since the 
start of the spell, is a function of two groups of variables. First, those which are firm specific: the 
cumulative changes in wages, in the price of intermediate inputs, and in the production of the firm. 
Second, the sector-specific and macro variables such as the variation in the sectoral inflation, which 
corresponds to the common shocks in the industry, as well as macro variables that might have had an 
impact on firms pricing decisions: dummies for the VAT change and dummies for the euro cash 
change-over. However, these desired price changes are only triggered when the expected gains from 
such changes are exceeding the induced adjustment costs.   
 
    The estimation of the model raises several issues. In particular, we check for the possible existence 
of unobserved heterogeneity and consider the possibility that some regressors are endogenous. In order 
to tackle these various endogeneity problems, we adopt a combination of the approaches suggested by 
Rivers and Vuong (1988) and Wooldridge (2005). Ignoring the endogeneity of the state-dependent 
regressors leads to a strong under-estimation of their impact on the probability of a price change. 
However, the comparison of the estimates associated with the methods either ignoring or accounting 
for the possible existence of unobserved heterogeneity seems to indicate that the magnitude of this 
unobserved heterogeneity is quite limited here.  
 
    Our results show that although wage changes occur almost as often as variations in the price of 
intermediate input prices, the latter induce many more price changes than the former. Firms also 
appear to react significantly to changes in the producer price index of their industry: relative prices 
matter. Variations in labor costs as well as in the production level also appear to increase the 
likelihood of a price change but their influence seems to be of lesser importance for explaining 
producer price variations. We estimate a standard state-dependent model as well as an unconstrained 
dynamic model where past changes in the firm' environment do not necessarily all have the same 
impact on the probability to set a new price. This more flexible model shows that firms react with 
some delay to production changes while they react more promptly to cost changes. Finally, our results 
point to an asymmetry in price adjustments. When they face cost variations, firms appear to adjust 
their prices upward more often and more rapidly than they do it downward.   
Résumé non technique  
 
 
    L'exploitation récente de bases de données microéconomiques nombreuses, tant sur les prix à la 
consommation que sur les prix à la production, a fourni une description approfondie des 
caractéristiques des changements de prix et de la durée des épisodes de prix. Cependant, nous 
disposons de beaucoup moins d'éléments pour évaluer, au niveau microéconomique, l'importance du 
différentiel entre ces variations de prix et celles qui auraient dû avoir lieu si les prix étaient 
parfaitement flexibles, compte tenu de la fréquence et de l'amplitude des changements dans 
l'environnement économique des firmes (principalement les variations de la demande et des coûts). 
    Dans cet article, nous proposons une analyse empirique de l'impact, au niveau microéconomique, 
des changements dans l'environnement des firmes sur leurs décisions de changement de prix. De fait, 
la plupart des changements dans l'environnement économique des firmes ne conduit pas à des 
changements de prix puisque la probabilité d'observer un changement de prix sachant que 
l'environnement de la firme a changé n'est que de 21%. Ceci montre qu'il existe une certaine rigidité 
des prix puisque des prix flexibles devraient s'ajuster aux variations de coûts et/ou de demande 
auxquelles l'entreprise fait face. On estime alors un modèle probit ordonné pour modéliser ces 
décisions. Cette estimation est réalisée sur un échantillon de 2 401 firmes du secteur industriel français 
observée mensuellement pendant au moins 12 mois consécutifs entre octobre 1998 et décembre 2005. 
En plus de leur périodicité mensuelle, l'avantage des données utilisées est que nous avons pu les 
fusionner avec une autre enquête auprès des firmes sur le coût du travail effectuée par le Ministère du 
Travail, l'enquête ACEMO. On peut donc étudier de manière assez détaillée, l'impact sur les prix des 
variations du prix des consommations intermédiaires, des salaires, du niveau de production de la firme 
considérée, ainsi que celui du taux d'inflation des prix à la production au niveau de la NACE-2. 
 
    Le modèle considéré est un modèle « state-dependent » assez simple, proche de celui proposé par 
Cecchetti (1986). Dans ce modèle, les firmes sont supposées avoir la possibilité de modifier leur prix 
en réaction à des changements de leur environnement (comme des variations du prix du coût des 
facteurs de production ou de la demande). Cependant, elles ne procèdent pas nécessairement à de tels 
changements puisqu'elles peuvent estimer qu'il est trop coûteux d'ajuster fréquemment leur prix, à 
cause de l'existence de coûts d'ajustement liés soit à des coûts physiques de changement de prix soit 
aux réactions des clients. Le principal déterminant des changements de prix est la différence entre le 
prix optimal (hors coûts d'ajustement) à la date t et le prix effectif à la t-1. Le changement de prix 
désiré, qui correspond à la variation du prix optimal depuis le début de l'épisode de prix est une 
fonction de deux groupes de variables. Premièrement, les variables qui sont spécifiques à la firme : les 
changements cumulés des salaires, du prix des consommations intermédiaires et de la production de la 
firme. Deuxièmement, des variables sectorielles et macroéconomiques telles que la variation du taux 
d'inflation sectoriel, qui correspond à un choc commun dans l'industrie considérée, aussi bien qu'à des 
variables macroéconomiques qui peuvent avoir un impact sur les décisions de prix de la firme telles 
que des variables indicatrices pour les changement de TVA ou le passage à l'euro fiduciaire. 
 
    L'estimation de ce modèle soulève plusieurs questions. En particulier, nous vérifions l'éventuelle 
présence d'hétérogénéité inobservée et tenons compte de l'endogénéité de certains régresseurs. Pour 
traiter les problèmes d'endogénéité, nous adoptons une combinaison d'approches suggérées par Rivers 
and Vuong (1988) et Wooldridge (2005). Le fait d'ignorer l'endogénéité des régresseurs qui dépendent 
des décisions passées conduit à une forte sous-estimation de leur impact sur la probabilité de 
changement de prix. En revanche, l'amplitude de l'hétérogénéité inobservée semble être très limitée. 
 
    Nos résultats montrent que bien que les changements de salaires soient presqu'aussi fréquents que 
les changements du prix des consommations intermédiaires, ces derniers induisent beaucoup plus de 
changements de prix que les premiers : les changements du prix des consommations intermédiaires 
sont le principal déterminant des changements de prix à la production. Les firmes semblent aussi 
réagir significativement aux variations des indices de prix à la production de leur industrie : les prix 
relatifs ont donc une importance. Les variations du coût du travail ainsi que celles de la production semblent aussi accroître la probabilité de changement de prix, mais ils expliquent une part plus faible 
des variations de prix à la production. 
        L'estimation d'un modèle dynamique non contraint (où l'impact des valeurs retardées des 
changements de l'environnement des entreprises n'est pas contraint à être constant) permet d'améliorer 
le résultat des estimations par rapport à celles obtenues avec un modèle « state-dependent » standard. 
Les firmes réagissent aux changements de production avec un certain délai alors qu'elles répondent 
plus rapidement aux changements de coûts. Finalement, nos résultats montrent également qu'il existe 
une asymétrie dans les ajustements de prix. En cas de variation des coûts, les firmes semblent ajuster 
leur prix à la hausse plus souvent et plus rapidement qu'elles ne le font à la baisse. 
     
 1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a tremendous amount of research aimed at characterizing and
explaining price stickiness at the micro level. Indeed, a number of papers have provided
a thorough description of the frequency of price changes and/or of the duration of price
spells, both for consumer and producer prices, using quite large and extensive datasets (see
among many others Bils and Klenow, 2004, Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008, and Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2008, for the United-States, Dhyne et al., 2006, and Vermeulen et al., 2007, for
the euro area, as well as Baudry et al., 2007, and Gautier, 2008, for France).
However, while we now have a thorough knowledge of price stickiness, the empirical evi-
dence about price rigidity is, at the micro level, still quite scarce. In other words, while we
now have a large amount of empirical evidence about how often and by how much prices
change, we have much less elements to assess, at the micro level, the discrepancy between
these price variations and those we would expect if prices were fully ￿ exible, given the fre-
quency and magnitude of changes in the ￿rms economic environment. Do ￿rm prices react
as fast and as fully as they should when costs, demand conditions and/or the ￿rm competi-
tors￿prices change? Answering this question is not that easy because while the available
microeconomic databases about consumer or producer prices contain lots of information
about these prices, they are most often lacking the information about the main determining
microeconomic factors of price changes, namely costs and demand changes. Some studies
have concentrated on the reaction of individual prices to in￿ ation, considered either at the
macroeconomic level or at the industry level (e.g. see Cecchetti, 1986, Lach and Tsiddon,
1992, and more recently, FougŁre et al., 2007, Gagnon, 2009, among many others). Unfor-
tunately, although these studies help in understanding how ￿rms react to changes in their
relative price, they do not tell much about how they respond to demand and cost shocks
they may experience. Another line of research, initiated by Blinder (1991), provides some
answers to these questions, based on survey data. Indeed, Blinder (1991) and Blinder et al.
(1998) ran a survey to investigate the pricing behavior of US manufacturing ￿rms, focusing
in particular on their reaction to changes in costs and/or in the demand for their product.
1Following Blinder (1991), several central banks of the Eurosystem have recently conducted
surveys to shed light on the pricing behavior of manufacturing ￿rms in the Euro area (see
Fabiani et al., 2006 and 2007, for the Euro area and Loupias and Ricart, 2006, for France;
see also Hall, Walsh, and Yates, 2000, for UK, and Apel et al., 2005, for Swedish ￿rms). One
of the main conclusions of these surveys is that ￿rms indeed change their prices less often
than what changes in their environment would dictate in the absence of adjustment costs.
The route we pursue here follows that initiated by Buckle and Carlson (2000) who used
data from the quarterly business surveys conducted by the New-Zealand Institute of Eco-
nomic Research to assess, at the ￿rm level, the in￿ uence of input costs and demand variations
on price changes (see also Rupprecht (2008) for a recent study based on Swiss business sur-
vey data). Our approach can also be considered to be parent to the papers by Peltzman
(2000), Levy et al. (2002), Davis and Hamilton (2004) and, more recently, Stahl (2005) and
Eichenbaum et al. (2008) who, among others, consider the link between price changes and
either costs, wages or wholesale price variations at the micro level. In the Banque de France
business surveys, ￿rms are interviewed every month about the evolution of their prices,
about that of their intermediate inputs prices as well as about variations in the orders they
receive and in their production.1 Besides their monthly periodicity, a distinctive feature of
the data we use is the merging we have been able to make with another ￿rm-level survey
about labor costs run by the French Ministry of Labor. We are then in position to assess in
a quite detailed manner the impact on prices of the variations of intermediate input prices,
of wages, of the ￿rm production level as well as that of the producer price in￿ ation at the
NACE-2-digit level.
More precisely, we specify and estimate an ordered probit model close to that considered
in Cecchetti (1986) aimed at explaining, at the micro level, the occurrence and magnitude of
producer price changes in the French manufacturing sector over the years 1998 to 2005. Our
1This kind of business surveys is also conducted by other statistical o¢ ces and central
banks such as the INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques)
in France or the National Bank of Belgium.
2results show that changes in the price of intermediate inputs are the main driver of producer
price changes. Firms also react signi￿cantly to changes in the producer price index of their
industry: relative prices matter. Variations in labor costs as well as in the demand addressed
to the ￿rm also appear to increase the likelihood of a price change but their in￿ uence seem to
be of lesser importance for explaining producer price variations. We also show that estimating
an unconstrained dynamic model allows to improve the estimation results as compared to
those associated with a standard state-dependent model "￿ la Cecchetti".
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some basic empir-
ical facts about price changes and those in the ￿rms￿environment. Section 3 describes the
model. Section 4 provides a descriptive presentation of our dataset. The econometric models
and estimation results are then presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Changes in prices versus changes in the ￿rms envi-
ronment: some basic facts.
According to a survey conducted by the Banque de France in 2004 (Loupias and Ricart,
2006), about 25% of French manufacturing ￿rms having faced demand or cost shocks in
2003 did not change their prices during that same year. The same conclusion can be drawn
from other surveys conducted in the USA (Blinder et al., 1998) or in other countries of the
Euro area (Fabiani et al., 2006 and 2007): ￿rms may choose not to modify their prices even
when their environment changes.
The same message is conveyed by our data, consisting of the series of the Banque de
France monthly business surveys, merged with the ACEMO2 surveys, conducted by the
French Ministry of Labor.3 In the former set of surveys, ￿rms are asked every month to
tell whether they modi￿ed their prices during the previous month and to give a qualitative
2ACEMO is the acronym for "ActivitØ et Conditions d￿ Emploi de la Main d￿ Oeuvre",
that is "Activity (hours) and Working Conditions of the Workforce".
3See Section 4 below for a detailed description of these data.
3assessment of the magnitude of the change, which may range from a large, medium or small
decrease to a small, medium or large increase. Firms are also asked about the evolution of
the price of their intermediate inputs and about those of the orders they receive and of their
production level. The second series of surveys we use contains information about wages at
the ￿rm level, which we were able to match with the Banque de France business surveys.
The next table provides the frequency of price changes as well as those of costs and/or
production. We consider that a ￿rm experienced a change in its environment as soon as
either the price of its intermediate inputs, the wage of its workers or its production4 level
changed during the month under review. We have then made a cross-comparison with the
occurrence of price changes.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
These ￿gures clearly point to an asymmetry. Out of 100 observed price changes, 87
coincide with a change in the ￿rm environment; a proportion which reaches 96.1% if we
consider changes in the environment that occurred either during the month under review or
during the previous month (￿gures not reported here). However, most changes in the ￿rm
environment do not induce a price change since the probability of observing a price change
given that the ￿rm environment has changed is only 21%. This shows the existence of some
price rigidity as fully ￿ exible prices should adjust to the variations in costs and/or production
that ￿rms experience.
The next two tables provide more details about the link between price changes and
variations in costs. From Table 2, one can conclude that changes in the price of intermediate
inputs are a much stronger driver of price changes than wage changes. Although wage changes
occur almost as often as variations in the price of intermediate input prices, the latter
induce many more price changes than the former. There are several explanations of this
observed fact. The ￿rst explanation clearly lies in the relative importance of these two factors
4Here, inventories are not considered. Demand and production are thus assumed to be
equal. Robustness checks on the econometric results have shown that results are very similar
whether we use the demand (i.e. orders received) or the production variable.
4in total production. The share of intermediate input costs in total production of French
manufacturing ￿rms was about 70% in 2005 while that of labor cost was 20% (SESSI, 2008).
It is then quite natural for shocks on intermediate input prices to have a stronger impact on
prices than wage changes do. Another explanation lies in the magnitude of the cost change
corresponding to these two components of the production cost: the intermediate input price
changes are likely to be of a larger magnitude than those of wages, thus leading to an higher
likelihood to induce a price adjustment. Unfortunately, the nature of our data does not
allow us to assess directly the relevance of this hypothesis as the data about intermediate
input prices and wages come from two di⁄erent sources and are of a di⁄erent nature: the
information about wage changes obtained from the ACEMO surveys is quantitative but
that about intermediate input prices contained in the Banque de France business surveys
is qualitative. Nevertheless, one can get some indications from other sources. According to
Heckel et al. (2008), the average wage change in the French manufacturing industry is slightly
above 2.2% while changes in intermediate good prices reported in Gautier (2008) are about
4%. This again certainly contributes to the larger impact of intermediate input changes.
Another possible explanation of this stronger impact of intermediate input price changes
as compared to that stemming from wage changes may be found in the nature of the shocks
associated with these variations. The former might be more easily incorporated by ￿rms in
their prices as they are more "visible" to the ￿rms￿customers and because they might be
more synchronized and common to all ￿rms in the same sector than wage changes. Then,
the level of uncertainty about the price decisions of other ￿rms and/or the acceptability of
price increases by customers might be stronger when intermediate input prices are seen to
increase than when (unobserved) wage increases are granted to the ￿rms￿employees. Finally,
a last possible explanation of this rather low impact of wage variations on prices may be
found in the evolution of labor productivity, stemming from the technological change and/or
from possible quantity adjustments in the labor force (e. g. see Fuss, 2008). An increase in
labor productivity clearly lowers the need for ￿rms to incorporate wage increases in prices,
at least when this productivity increase is not fully transmitted to wages.
5INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The next table provides further information by making the distinction between increases
and decreases. Here again, prices react more, both positively and negatively, to changes in
the price of intermediate inputs than to changes in wages. The main message of this set of
￿gures is that there does not seem to exist a very strong asymmetry in the reaction of prices
to cost changes. Although the probability to observe price increases when costs increase is
slightly higher than that to observe price decreases following cost decreases, the response
of prices to such variations is not much di⁄erent whether these variations are positive or
negative.5 The fact that some price increases (resp. decreases) may follow cost decreases
(resp. increases) can be partly explained by variations in demand which are ignored here but
also by other unobserved factors, such as a change in the ￿rm competitive environment for
example.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Finally, the next table shows that the likelihood of a price change is signi￿cantly higher
after a cost variation than what it is after a change in production. Despite the fact that the
occurrence of production changes is much more frequent than that of cost changes, prices
change much more often after the occurrence of the latter than what they do after changes
in production. Here again, the nature of the shocks involved may explain this di⁄erence.
Changes in production may be more idiosyncratic than input price variations, thus leading
to less price changes because of the uncertainty regarding the ￿rms￿competitors pricing
decisions.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
On the whole, it appears that price changes are clearly most often associated with changes
in the ￿rms environment, be they changes in their costs or in the demand they get. From
5However, we shall see later that this symmetry does not hold when a proper econometric
analysis is performed.
6the modelling point of view, this calls for a state-dependent pricing behavior, a conclusion
which is also emphasized by Rupprecht (2008).
3 The model: a simple state-dependent pricing model
The model we consider is a quite simple state-dependent pricing model, close in spirit to
that proposed by Cecchetti (1986) and considered, inter-alia by Buckle and Carlson (2000)
and, more recently, by Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005), Dhyne et al. (2007) and Rupprecht
(2008). In this model, ￿rms are assumed to possibly adjust their price in reaction to changes
in their environment (such as variations in input costs or in demand). However, they do not
necessarily proceed to such changes as they may ￿nd it too costly to frequently adjust their
prices, due to the existence of price adjustment costs, either physical or associated with the
reactions of their customers.
3.1 The optimal (frictionless) price
The main incentive for a ￿rm to change its e⁄ective price is the magnitude of the discrepancy
between the optimal price P ￿
it accounting for changes in its environment and the price that
will be e⁄ective if no change is decided, that is, the price at time t ￿ 1; Pit￿1: We may
expect that the likelihood to observe a price change is higher the larger this discrepancy.
Now, empirically, the problem we are facing is that the optimal (frictionless) price, P ￿
it, is
not observable. In order to circumvent this problem, it is then ￿rst necessary to model this
optimal price in a way that allows to express it as a function of observable variables.6
We consider a ￿rm selling its product on a market where monopolistic competition pre-
vails. Assuming a constant price elasticity of demand, given by a (a < ￿1), pro￿t maximiza-
6Another option is chosen in Dhyne et al. (2007). Because the information they have
is limited to prices, they assume a particular decomposition of the optimal price associated
with the underlying unobserved costs and demand and estimate a state-dependent model
explaining price changes.









where Mcit is the marginal cost. We derive this marginal cost from a simple static Cobb-
Douglas cost function :







where Qit represents the ￿rm production level, wit represents the wage cost, iipit the price of









+ln(Ai(j)t) + (￿ ￿ 1)ln(Qit)
+￿ ln(wit) + ￿ ln(iipit):
We assume that Ai(j)t can be decomposed into three multiplicative components: a ￿rm
speci￿c e⁄ect Ai, a sector-speci￿c e⁄ect, Bj, and a third term representing a sectoral (com-
mon) time-varying component of prices Cjt. Because the number of time periods and that
of sectors are large in our data (T is greater than 100 and the number of sectors is also
quite large), estimating this last component would induce a large loss of degrees of freedom.
However, Dhyne et al. (2007) show the strong correlation that exists between the sector spe-
ci￿c production price indices and such an estimated common (sectoral) component in prices.
This is why we have deliberately decided to approximate this (unobserved) component by
the sectoral Production Price Indices at the NACE2 level (PPIjt). We then set Cjt = PPI￿
jt,
where ￿ is a positive parameter.
3.2 The desired price change
As stated above, the main driver of price changes is the discrepancy between the optimal
(frictionless) price P ￿
it and the e⁄ective price at time t ￿ 1; Pit￿1, that is, in logarithm, the
di⁄erence p￿
it ￿ pit￿1 (=ln(P ￿
it=Pit￿1): Unfortunately, in our data, neither P ￿
it nor the level of
Pit￿1 are observed. However, along a price spell that started at time t0, one has:




it ￿ pit￿1 = p
￿
it ￿ pit0:
Moreover, assuming as usual in state-dependent pricing models that when ￿rms decide
to adjust their prices, they fully adjust to the optimal price level, i.e. pit0 = p￿
it0; the desired
price change (￿pd
it) can be written as
p
￿














+(￿ ￿ 1)￿s lnQit
+￿￿s lnwit
+￿￿s lniipit + uit
where ￿sx represents the variation of x over the course of the spell and where:
￿s ln(Ai(j)t) = ￿￿s ln(PPIjt) + ￿s ln(Ai) + ￿s ln(Bj)
= ￿￿s ln(PPIjt)











= ￿￿s ln(PPIjt) + (￿ ￿ 1)￿s lnQit + ￿￿s lnwit + ￿￿s lniipit + uit
The desired price change, which corresponds to the variation of the optimal price since
the start of the spell, is thus a function of two groups of variables. First, those which are ￿rm
speci￿c: the cumulative change in wages; the cumulative change in the price of intermediate
9inputs, the cumulative change in the production level and, second, the sector-speci￿c and
macro variables such as the variation in the sectoral in￿ ation, which corresponds to the
common shocks in the industry, as well as macro variables that might have had an impact
on ￿rms pricing decisions : dummies for the VAT change that occurred in France in April
2000 (the VAT went down from 20.6% to 19.6%) and dummies for the euro cash change-over
in 2002.7
3.3 The price change rule
The last step of the modelling relates to the rule that governs the ￿rm price changes. This
rule states that when the foregone pro￿t due to the di⁄erence Pit ￿ P ￿
it is large enough to
o⁄set the cost incurred when changing the price, the price is changed. Sheshinski and Weiss
(1977, 1983) derive a general set of conditions under which it is optimal for a ￿rm to adopt
such a target-threshold pricing policy, often referred to as an (S;s) rule. We use here a
speci￿cation close in spirit to that of Cecchetti (1986).
The ￿rm￿ s price change rule can thus be characterized by the maximum distance by
which Pit is allowed to deviate from P ￿
it before the price is changed. The ￿rm is assumed
to increase its price when p￿
it ￿ pit￿1 is positive and larger than a given threshold qit which
is positively related to the price adjustment costs. The ￿rm will lower its price if, at the
opposite, p￿
it ￿ pit￿1 is negative and larger, in absolute value, than a given threshold q0
it .
Our data allow to distinguish between small (SI), medium (MI) and large (LI) price
increases (resp. decreases, SD, MD, LD). However, given the very limited number of medium
and large increases and decreases, these have been merged together and we consider only
5 outcomes: small increases, medium or large increases, small decreases, medium or large
7These last two variables have been included in our estimated models even though they
do not explicitly appear in the above speci￿cation.
10decreases, and no change. Then, the price change rule can be summarized as follows
￿pit = LD < SD < 0 if ￿p
d
it ￿ q1i(j)t
￿pit = SD < 0 if q1i(j)t < ￿p
d
it ￿ q2i(j)t
￿pit = 0 if q2i(j)t < ￿p
d
it ￿ q3i(j)t
￿pit = SI > 0 if q3i(j)t < ￿p
d
it ￿ q4i(j)t
￿pit = LI > SI > 0 if ￿p
d
it > q4i(j)t
with pit = lnPit. We allow for heterogeneity in the thresholds q￿i(j)t across years, industries
and ￿rms/products; we assume that
q￿i(j)t = q￿ + ￿j + ￿t + ￿i ￿ = 1;2;3;4:
where the industry and time e⁄ects (resp. ￿j and ￿t) are ￿xed parameters to be estimated
while ￿i is a ￿rm speci￿c random e⁄ect, possibly correlated with the regressors. q￿; ￿ =
1;2;3;4 are the threshold parameters.
4 The dataset
Our dataset results from the merging of two ￿rm-level datasets, the series of the Banque
de France monthly business surveys and a dataset obtained from the French Ministry of
Labor containing information about ￿rms wages and employment, with the set of monthly
producer price indices computed by INSEE, the French national statistical institute, at the
2-digit NACE level.
The aim of this section is to provide a general overview of each of these datasets and to de-
scribe the way we have used them to build our econometric sample. The main characteristics
of our econometric dataset are then presented.
114.1 Data sources
4.1.1 The Banque de France business surveys
The pooling of the monthly Banque de France manufacturing industry business surveys over
the period January 1996 to December 2005 constitutes our core database. This sample covers
a signi￿cant fraction of the French manufacturing industry. Over the period, it represents
about 1.4 million workers, that is about 1/3 of total employment of the French manufactur-
ing industry. The statistical unit is a speci￿c product, de￿ned at the 4-digit NACE level,
produced in a given plant/establishment. About 300 di⁄erent product groups are considered.
There may be multiple observations for some large ￿rms as several establishments of the
same ￿rm may be surveyed and because some (large) establishments may report for more
than one product. Then, we de￿ne an observation unit as a triplet ￿￿rm-establishment-
product". For the sake of simplicity, this will be referred to as a ￿￿rm￿thereafter. Indeed,
the very large majority of surveyed entities consists of ￿rms with only one establishment
and only one product. On the whole, the set of business surveys from January 1996 to
December 2005 contains about 480,000 observations, corresponding to about 8,800 di⁄erent
￿rms. Indeed, due to the continuous updating of the sample because of entries and exits
of ￿rms in the sampled population as well as changes in the sampling process (e.g. some
products may be discarded while others are included at some point in the period), the sample
is not balanced. The average number of units interviewed is about 4,000 per month.
The data are essentially obtained through phone interviews conducted during the ￿rst
week of each month. Firms are asked about the evolution of some key variables (product
prices, intermediate input prices, production, orders received, employment) both during the
month under review, i.e. most often the month before the one when the survey is conducted8
and during the 12 months elapsed since the same month one year before. They are also
8An exception is for surveys conducted in September in which ￿rms are asked about vari-
ations that occured since July as, since 1998 (the starting date of our econometric sample),
there is no survey in August. Until 1997, the survey was not conducted in July nor in August.
12asked about the level of their ￿nished product stocks and that of their capacity utilization,
as compared to a normal situation. Finally, three questions are also asked about the expected
evolution of the product price and those of the ￿rm production and employment levels over
the next few months.
The main variables that we are using in the present study are:
- the variation in the price of the speci￿c product under consideration,
- the variation in the price of intermediate inputs used in the ￿rm production process,
- the variation in the ￿rm production level.
For each of these three variables, the information available is qualitative. Seven possi-
ble values of the evolution are considered: "a large decrease", "a moderate decrease", "a
small decrease", "no price change", "a small increase", "a moderate increase" and "a large
increase". However, as already mentioned, given the small number of medium and large
variations (either positive or negative) observed, we have grouped them together so that we
only distinguish 5 possible outcomes.
The main features of this database as well as those of the dataset used for estimating the
model are presented in section 4.2 below.
4.1.2 The data set on wages (ACEMO survey)9
One important limitation of the Banque de France business survey is the absence of infor-
mation about the evolution of the ￿rm labor cost. In order to circumvent this problem, we
have obtained access to another survey (named ACEMO) carried out by the French Ministry
of Labor. The population covered by this survey consists of establishments with at least ten
employees in the market non-farm sector, including both the private sector and state-owned
companies. Data are collected by a postal survey at the end of every quarter for about 38,000
establishments. The ￿les have been made available to us for the period starting at the last
quarter of 1998 and ending at the fourth quarter of 2005.
9For a thorough presentation of the ACEMO survey, see Heckel et al. (2008).
13The ACEMO survey collects information about the level of the monthly base wage, inclu-
sive of employees social security contributions. The data exclude bonuses, allowances, and
other forms of compensation. The information refers to a speci￿c job position, not a speci￿c
worker. Then, one can observe a wage change because the wage of the worker occupying the
position has changed or because the position is given to another worker with a di⁄erent wage.
In this last case, a speci￿c ￿ ag indicates such a change. The survey asks ￿rms about the
monthly base wage of up to 12 job positions belonging to one of four occupational categories
(manual workers, clerical workers, intermediate occupations, managers). For establishments
with several job positions inquired, we have computed an average evolution of the wage cost,
using the available information about the structure of total employment of the establishment.
This provides a satisfactory evaluation of the evolution of the labor cost incurred by ￿rms.
Indeed, as emphasized in Heckel et al. (2008), the base wage is a relevant indicator of the
￿rms wage cost since in France, the base wage represents 77.9% of gross earnings. Further-
more, most bonuses (like "13th month" payments or holidays bonuses) constitute a ￿xed
part of earnings and are linked to the base wage. Performance-related bonuses, which are
disconnected from the base wage, represent only a small fraction (3.2%) of workers￿earnings.
Moreover, excluding or including bonuses and other payments does not alter the distribution
of earnings of full-time employees.
The quarterly periodicity of this survey raises an important issue as the data obtained
from the Banque de France business surveys are monthly. Two options were available for
matching the two datasets: a ￿rst possibility was to keep the monthly frequency and make
some assumptions about the unobserved timing of wage changes within quarters; alterna-
tively, one could have aggregated the business surveys over time to get them on a quarterly
periodicity. The ￿rst option has been preferred because it allows us to study more thor-
oughly the dynamics of price adjustments. Then, we have assumed that wage changes are
more likely to occur during the ￿rst month of each quarter. Two justi￿cations can be given
to sustain this assumption. First, in France, the minimum wage was, until 2009, usually
adjusted according to the CPI in￿ ation every year in July (i.e. the ￿rst month of the third
14quarter). Consequently, not only workers paid at the minimum wage see their wage increased
in July but also those who are in the lowest part of the wage distribution. Also, many wage
increases get e⁄ective on the ￿rst of January each year. Indeed, a recent survey conducted
about wage-setting practices in France (MontornŁs et al., 2009) shows that more than 75%
of wage changes occur during the ￿rst month of the quarter when they take place. It then
seems not a too strong assumption to consider that, in the absence of any other information,
wage changes that occur during a given quarter do so in the ￿rst month of this quarter.10
More information about the observed wage changes in the initial database as well as in
the econometric sample are also provided in section 4.2 below.
4.1.3 The Producer Price Indices
The last important information we need for estimating our model is the evolution of producer
price indices at the industry level. In order to maximize the matching, these production price
indices have been collected from the INSEE website using the 2-digit NACE decomposition
of the manufacturing industry. However, some indices were not available for the initial years
of the period and/or are terminating before the end of 2005, the last year for which the other
data are available.
4.2 The econometric database
Our econometric database results from the merging of the three databases described above.
Clearly, the matching between the list of establishments surveyed in the Banque de France
business surveys and that of establishments of the ACEMO survey is not perfect. Moreover,
10In order to check the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we have estimated
models where wage changes were imputed either at the second or third month of the quarter.
The results were clearly less satisfactory. Results associated with the second option, i.e.
consisting of an aggregation over time to get a fully quarterly database are presented and
discussed in Horny and Sevestre (2008). They are qualitatively similar to those presented
below with, however, a slightly lower precision.
15as mentioned just above, the absence of production price indices for some industries at some
periods also induces a loss of observations when the matching is done. This matching thus
resulted in a ￿le containing about 128,000 observations.
Finally, a further trimming of this dataset had to be done, due to the presence of some
missing observations but also because of the need to discard observations corresponding
to left-censored spells. Indeed, our model assumes that price changes are triggered on the
basis of the evolution of the cost and production variables since the previous price change.
Then, all left-censored spells, i.e. all observations corresponding to spells for which the ￿rst
observation did not immediately followed a price change had to be deleted. A last loss of
observations was also induced by the restriction that we imposed that a given ￿rm-product
had to be observed over at least 12 consecutive periods.
Finally, we ended with a sample containing 51,067 observations, corresponding to 2,401
￿rms products observed over at least 12 consecutive months during the period October
1998 to December 2005. The decomposition by industry (at the 2-digit NACE level) of our
econometric sample and that of the initial business survey database in January 2005 are
given in table 5 below.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
This table deserves two comments. First, the main characteristics of the initial databases
used to build our econometric sample have been preserved. Given that the Banque de France
business surveys are based on a representative sample of the French manufacturing industry,
one can reasonably expect our econometric sample to be also representative. Second, these
￿gures indicate that the list of most represented industries/products in the sample is quite
diverse. The sample contains food products, textile products as well as metal products and
machinery and other equipment goods.
There are four crucial variables in our study (￿nal product price changes, intermediate
inputs price changes, wage changes and production changes). Table 6 then provides some
basic statistics about the frequency of changes for these variables.
16INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Again, this table shows that the main characteristics of the initial databases used to
build our econometric sample have been preserved. Also, it shows that while the occurrence
of price changes is about as frequent as that of cost changes (be they due to intermediate
input price variations or to wage variations), they are much less frequent than changes in
the ￿rm production level. As mentioned in Section 2, we may expect prices to respond more
strongly to the former than what they do to the latter.
5 Estimation results
5.1 The econometric model
As stated above, the model we wish to estimate is a probit model where the dependent
variable may take ￿ve di⁄erent ordered values, set arbitrarily to -2 for a "large or medium
price decrease", -1 for a "small decrease", 0 for "no change", 1 for a "small increase" and 2
for a "large or medium increase". This model can then be written as:
￿pit = ￿2 if ￿pd
it < q1i(j)t
￿pit = ￿1 if q2i(j)t ￿ ￿pd
it > q1i(j)t
￿pit = 0 if q3i(j)t ￿ ￿pd
it > q2i(j)t
￿pit = 1 if q4i(j)t ￿ ￿pd
it > q3i(j)t





it = ￿￿s ln(PPIjt) + (￿ ￿ 1)￿s lnQit + ￿￿s lnwit + ￿￿s lniipit
+￿1Dumeuro;J02 + ￿2Dumeuro;02 + ￿3DumV AT;A00 + ￿4DumV AT;00 + uit
where Dumeuro;J02 is a dummy variable taking value 1 for observations dated January 2002
(Euro cash-change over) and 0 otherwise; Dumeuro;02 is a dummy variable taking value 1 for
observations dated between July 2001 and June 2002, that is 6 months before and 6 months
after the Euro cash change-over. Along the same lines, we de￿ne DumV AT;A00 as a dummy
variable for the decrease in the VAT rate that occurred in April 2000 and DumV AT;00 as a
17dummy variable for the months of March, April and May of the same year. Indeed, for both
the Euro cash change-over and the VAT rate change, we suspect that their e⁄ect might have
spread over several months.
Because our data have a panel structure, we can check for the possible existence of unob-
served heterogeneity. We have then estimated our model both with and without unobserved
heterogeneity. More importantly, besides the question of the possible existence of unobserved
heterogeneity, one must consider the possibility that some regressors are endogenous. There
are indeed several reasons why one may suspect this is the case. First of all, because of the
nature of our data, it is most likely that the available statistical information is subject to
measurement errors. In particular, our assumption about the timing of wage changes is quite
likely not to correspond perfectly to the imperfectly observed wage changes. Another reason
why some regressors are quite likely to be endogenous has been pointed out by Card and
Sullivan (1988). Their argument is that in state-dependent models, the value of a regressor
which cumulates past values of a variable (e.g. past variations in wages) over the duration
of a spell is clearly dependent on the ￿rm past decisions regarding the endogenous variable.
Indeed, the less frequently a ￿rm changes its price, the higher is the value of the cumulative
sum of its past wage variations over a price spell, at least when these variations are of the
same sign. Thus, the state-dependent regressors in the model may be endogenous and pos-
sibly require a speci￿c treatment. Finally, a last possible cause of endogeneity is the likely
simultaneity of the ￿rm decisions regarding its price, its production level and the wage paid
to its workers. This simultaneity is quite likely to induce some contemporeanous correlation
between wage changes, production changes and price changes.
In order to tackle these various endogeneity problems, we adopt a combination of the
approaches suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and Wooldridge (2005). That is, we include
in the model the estimated residuals of the ￿rst stage regressions of the state-dependent
regressors on a set of instrumental variables, as suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988).
More precisely, we ￿rst regress our state-dependent regressors (￿siipit; ￿sQit; ￿s lnwit;
and ￿s ln(PPIjt)) on the lagged values (with lags 1 to 6) of the observed variations of the
18corresponding variables, i.e. the lagged values of the month to month changes of intermediate
input prices (￿iipit￿k), of output (￿Qit￿k), of wages (￿lnwit￿k), and of the sectoral price
index, i.e. the sectoral in￿ ation (￿ln(PPIjt￿k)). Our instruments set also contains a set
of industry and year dummies as well as dummies for the VAT change that occurred in
April 2000 and the Euro cash change-over in January 2002. The former instruments are
nothing but the lagged ￿rst di⁄erences of the cumulative sum de￿ning the state-dependent
regressors. Intuitively, what we do here is quite similar to the now usual approach consisting
of instrumenting endogenous regressors in panel models by their own lagged ￿rst di⁄erences
(e.g. see Arellano and Bover, 1995). Moreover, 6 months is the average duration of the
producer price spells in our sample (and in other datasets as well; e.g. see Gautier and
Sevestre, 2006). Then imposing a ￿xed number of lags in the ￿rst stage regression whatever
the duration of the spell is expected to break the dependence between the past price decisions
and the value of these cumulated changes. Indeed, this means that we regress cumulated
changes computed over spells lasting from 1 month to more than 24 months on the same
set of the ￿rst 6 lagged values of the ￿rst di⁄erences of our regressors. Finally, in order to
tackle furthermore the endogeneity associated with the implicit dynamic nature of the model,
we follow the suggestion by Wooldridge (2005) and include the ￿rst individual observation
of the dependent variable as a supplementary regressor in our model.11 This should also
help for weakening the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity (if any) and the
state-dependent regressors.
11This approach has also been recently adopted by Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005) in a
very similar context. However, we stick here to the initial suggestion of Wooldridge and use
the ￿rst available observation of the dependent variable as a supplementary regressor. This is
possible because our convention for de￿ning the start and the end of price spells is di⁄erent
from that used in Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005). In our case, a price change terminates a
price spell.
195.2 The baseline model estimates
Table 7 contains several estimates of the state-dependent model presented above. We have
indeed estimated two versions of this model, in order to assess the robustness of our results.
The ￿rst version of the model corresponds to the one presented in the previous section, where
5 outcomes are considered for price variations; again these 5 outcomes are: "a medium or
large decrease", "a small decrease", "no change", "a small increase" and "a medium or large
increase". The corresponding estimates are given in the ￿rst three pairs of columns of the
table. The ￿rst pair of columns corresponds to a simple ordered probit model where no
account is taken of the possible endogeneity of the regressors; the second one contains the
estimates associated with the endogeneity treatment "￿ la Rivers and Vuong (1988)"; the
third column contains a further treatment of the possible endogeneity that would be implied
by the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, following Wooldridge (2005).
Unfortunately, a possible drawback of our data is that, due to their qualitative nature and
the way they are collected, the "measurement" we have of the magnitude of the changes might
be imperfect. We would then have a problem of measurement errors, both on the dependent
variable and on the explanatory variables. While the problem of measurement errors on the
regressors may be expected to be solved by our instrumental variables estimation procedure,
this is clearly not true regarding the possible measurement problem of the dependent variable.
Indeed, we know that in non-linear models, measurement errors on the dependent variable
are much more harmful than what they are in linear models where they just increase the
variance of the disturbance term. In order to check whether this might be a serious problem
in our setup, we have re-estimated our model by considering only three outcomes: "a price
increase", "a price decrease" or "no change". We have applied a similar treatment to the
￿rm level price determinants, i.e. when considering a change in either input prices, wages
and production, we just distinguish between increases, decreases and stability and ignore
the information about the magnitude of the changes. There is clearly much less ambiguity
in the de￿nition of these three outcomes even if one can wonder whether some ￿rms may
consider that very small price changes can be considered as an absence of change in price.
20This last point is probably not really an issue. Indeed, the comparison provided in Gautier
and Sevestre (2006) of the characteristics of price changes observed in the Banque de France
business surveys considered here and those observed in quantitative data used by the INSEE
to compute the Producer Price indices show that the characteristics of price changes are
quite similar in both databases. In particular, the frequencies of price changes are close in
both databases, while we would expect the frequency observed in the business surveys to
be lower than that obtained from quantitative data if ￿rms had a systematic tendency to
consider small price changes as an absence of change. This is clearly not what we observe.
Then, our conclusions will be reinforced if the results obtained with both models tend to
converge, which is the case, as shown in the table below.
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
The ￿rst conclusion that clearly emerges from a quick look across the ￿rst three columns
of the table is that accounting for endogeneity is important. Ignoring the endogeneity of
the state-dependent regressors leads to a strong under-estimation of their impact on the
probability of a price change (columns pair 1). However, the comparison of the estimates
associated with the methods either ignoring or accounting for the possible existence of some
unobserved heterogeneity (columns pairs 2 and 3 and columns pairs 4 and 5) seem to indicate
that the magnitude of this unobserved heterogeneity is quite limited. Indeed, the estimated
￿ (representing the ratio of the individual e⁄ects variance to the total variance of the dis-
turbances) is for both models rather small (about 0.13) and the estimated coe¢ cients and
standard-errors do not change much from one set-up to the other. This does not necessarily
come as a surprise as we are modelling price changes here. While unobserved heterogeneity
is certainly an important component of the variability of the products price level, it is likely
to be of a lesser importance when considering price changes. Indeed, the variables that con-
stitute this unobserved heterogeneity in levels (e.g. the products di⁄erentiation, the level
of competition) are very likely not to vary much from month to month. Their contribution
to price variations may then be less important. However, one must keep in mind that the
other justi￿cation we provided for the existence of ￿rm/product individual e⁄ects was a
21possible heterogeneity in the thresholds de￿ning the di⁄erent magnitudes of price changes.
Our results indicate that, once industry di⁄erences are taken into account, the remaining
heterogeneity of these thresholds across ￿rms within a given industry is not very important.
Coming to the main economic messages conveyed by these estimates, one can ￿rst observe
that cumulated changes in the price of intermediate inputs are the main driver of price
changes. This result is common to the two versions of the model we consider and their
various estimates presented in table 7 (see also table 8 for marginal e⁄ects12). As an example,
according to the estimates of the 3-outcomes model (where we only di⁄erentiate between
increases, stability and decreases), an increase of 1% in intermediate input prices leads to an
increase of 1.4% point of the probability of a price increase (which is 10.5%) and a decrease
of 1.2% point of that of a price decrease (which equals 8.4%). One interesting consequence
of this almost symmetry is that the overall frequency of price changes is not much sensitive
to variations in costs and/or in the production level. When they face an increase in their
costs, more ￿rms are incited to increase their prices but an almost equivalent number of
￿rms which would have otherwise lowered their price switch their decision in this case to a
price stability decision (see Baudry et al., 2007, who show this also seems to be the case for
consumer prices and Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008 who obtain the same result on US data).
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
Cumulated variations in the sectoral price index appear to be the second most powerful
driver of price changes. The marginal e⁄ect of an increase of 1% in these cumulated variations
raises the probability to observe a price increase by 1.1% point and diminishes that to see a
price decrease by 0.9% point. Here again, we can observe a rather strong symmetry between
these two e⁄ects, leaving the overall frequency of price changes almost unchanged. Because
these variations can be seen as those of the common component in the product prices within
12Because all the state-dependent variables are of the same order of magnitude, the es-
timated coe¢ cients convey the same message as the marginal e⁄ects do. These marginal
e⁄ects are given in Table 8 below.
22a given industry, they can be interpreted as the variations that, if applied to its own price,
would leave the ￿rm￿relative price unchanged. This result is quite similar to those obtained
in the numerous studies that have considered the impact of the macro or sectoral in￿ ation
on price changes. Firms pay attention to the evolution of their prices as compared to those
of their competitors.
The impact of cumulated changes in the second cost component that we consider here,
namely wages, appears to be quite low and hardly signi￿cant. This result comes as a surprise
as it is di¢ cult to believe that wage increases have no e⁄ect on the likelihood of a price change.
The question then arises to explain this surprising result. A ￿rst possible explanation might
be that our econometric procedure does not solve the measurement problem we have with
this variable, thus inducing a downward bias in the estimated coe¢ cient. As the results
presented in the next section will show, this cannot be considered to be a valid explanation
of the current result. The other arguments presented in Section 2 may also explain a low
in￿ uence of wage changes on prices. However, they can hardly explain the quasi-absence of
impact obtained here. Finally, a last possible explanation of this low impact of wage changes
on prices might be that the impact of wage variations on price changes cannot be represented
by the standard state-dependent model that we consider here. This is a path we shall explore
in the next section.
Variations in the production level of the ￿rm have a signi￿cant but rather low impact
on the likelihood of a price change. This result is in line with both the descriptive statistics
presented in Section 2 above and with the results of the surveys conducted in the Eurosystem
(see Fabiani et al. 2006 and 2007): ￿rms prices are more reactive to costs changes than they
are to production changes. A ￿rst possible explanation is that production appears to be
more volatile than costs: in our sample, the frequency of changes in the production only
is about 35%, which is almost three times that of changes in costs only (see table 4 in
Section 2 above). Then, adjusting prices at the same pace would be probably very costly to
￿rms, both in terms of internal management and in terms of management of the customer
relationship. Second, variations in production are probably more idiosyncratic (across time
23and/or across ￿rms) than costs changes. Then, the level of uncertainty about both the
durability of observed changes in demand and the price decisions of other ￿rms is probably
quite important regarding these variations in production. This may explain why ￿rms may
decide to wait before changing their price when they face demand changes.
Finally, our estimates show no signi￿cant impact of the VAT change that occurred in April
2000, either immediately or during a longer period. The same is true regarding the euro cash
change-over. However, time dummies for 1999 and 2000 are signi￿cantly positive (see table
A1 in the appendix) which might correspond to a higher probability of price increases in
the period that followed the introduction of the euro in ￿rms￿￿nancial transactions from
January 1999 onwards.
5.3 Are current and recent variations in the environment more
likely to induce price changes?
In the above model, it is implicitly assumed that the impact on price changes of each past
variation of costs or of production level is the same. Indeed, price changes occur depending
on the value of the desired price change ￿pd




























However, one can wonder whether more recent variations in costs or demand have a stronger
impact on the ￿rm likelihood to change its prices. Indeed, one may consider that if a
past shock did not lead the ￿rm to proceed to a price adjustment, the contribution of
this shock for explaining a future price change is going to be of less importance. In other
words, ￿rms would discount past losses due to unadjusted prices. A possible rationalization
of this behavior would be that despite the absence of adjustment of their prices to a shock,
￿rms might well have proceeded to other kinds of adjustments, namely quantity adjustment
regarding their inputs for example, thus being able to partly o⁄set the shock: shocks on
24input prices may lead to some input substitution while shocks on demand may lead ￿rms to
adjust their inventories accordingly (e.g. see Aguirregabiria, 1999).
In order to check whether assuming a constant impact of past costs and production
changes is a valid assumption, we have estimated models where we do not impose this


































Obviously, the last k terms (k ￿ 4) are set to zero whenever the duration of the price
spell is less than 5 ￿ k months, in which case, the last and possibly previous terms are not
relevant. The results that have been obtained are presented in table 9 below.
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
The ￿rst two conclusions that emerge from this set of estimates are:13
1) the results here are quite di⁄erent from those presented in the previous section. This
is a clear indication that assuming, as we implicitly do in standard state-dependent models,
that all past costs and production changes have the same impact on price changes is an
heroic assumption.
2) However, the conclusions that we have drawn from the previous results about the
relative importance of the impact on price changes of intermediate input price changes,
wage changes, production and sectoral price variations remain valid: according to this new
set of results, the ￿rst listed of these determinants is still, by far, the main driver of price
13Because we have a larger number of parameters to estimate here, the set of instruments
has been increased by adding a set of quarterly dummies plus two monthly dummies for
January and July (which correspond to months with more frequent wage changes) to the
previous instruments set.
25changes while changes in production level still appear to have a modest impact on price
changes.
However, it is worth having a closer look at these estimates because there are some new
insights to get from them. First, while the estimates of the standard state-dependent model
presented in the previous section led to the surprising conclusion that wage variations seemed
to have no signi￿cant impact on price changes, the results obtained with this more ￿ exible
model show that wages do impact signi￿cantly the probability to observe price changes.
Indeed, according to the estimates of the model distinguishing 5 outcomes, an increase
of 1% in the wage growth rate raises the probability of a price increase by 0.5% while
according to the estimates of the 3-outcomes model, the occurrence of a wage increase raises
the probability of a price increase by 0.6% (see table 10 below). This clearly shows that
wage changes do impact price changes. Nevertheless, their in￿ uence remains much lower
than that of intermediate inputs price changes. Indeed, according to the estimates of the
3-outcome model, an increase in the price of intermediate inputs raises the probability of
a price increase by 2.7%, that is 5 times the impact of the occurrence of a wage change.
The arguments proposed in Section 2 to explain this important di⁄erence in the impact
of the two variables remain relevant here. First, the relative importance of intermediate
inputs costs as compared to labor costs is the most evident explanation of such a di⁄erence.
Second, as also previously mentioned, the magnitude of wage changes is smaller than that
of intermediate inputs price changes. This also directly impacts on the likelihood of a price
change. Moreover, this di⁄erence in magnitudes may have an indirect e⁄ect: the cost for the
￿rm of non-adjusting the price is lower after a wage change than what it is when intermediate
inputs prices change. Then, after a (small) wage change, the ￿rm can decide to wait for
making the necessary adjustment (See Konieczny and Rumler, 2006, for a theoretical model
exploiting this argument). If, moreover, as shown in Levy et al. (2002), the sensitivity of
prices to a cost shock is larger the larger the magnitude of the shock, this may also explain the
lower sensitivity of prices to wage changes. Another possible explanation of the low impact
of wage changes on prices might be found in the nature of the shocks associated with these
26variations. Variations in wages might be less easily incorporated by ￿rms in their prices as
they are less "visible" to the ￿rms￿customers than those of intermediate input prices. Firms
would then postpone the price adjustments induced by wage changes until they proceed to
price changes induced by intermediate inputs price variations. This would explain why we
observe so few price changes occurring when wages change but other costs remain stable
(see table 3 in Section 2). A fourth argument that may explain this limited impact of wage
variations on prices is the possibility for ￿rms to take bene￿t of productivity improvements
associated with technological evolutions and/or with quantities adjustments in the labor
input (e.g. see Fuss, 2008). Indeed, several studies have pointed to a limited sensibility of
wages to productivity changes (e.g. see Biscourp et al., 2005, Cardoso and Portela, 2009,
Guiso et al., 2005, and, more recently, Katay, 2008, and Fuss and Wintr, 2009). In other
words, it could be that ￿rms partially o⁄set the consequences of wage increases through
the "capture" of a fraction of productivity gains they may experience. Another interesting
result to be noticed is that according to the 5-outcome model estimates, past wage changes
(i.e. those accounted for in our "remaining cumulative wage" variable) appear to impact
signi￿cantly price changes. It seems that ￿rms that granted wage increases to their workers
without having the possibility to adjust their prices immediately proceed to a "catch-up"
after a while, maybe at the same time as they make a price adjustment associated with
another cost or production level variation. However, this e⁄ect disappears when one does
not use the quantitative measure of price variations but only considers a distinction between
wage increases, decreases or stability.
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
Another interesting conclusion that one can draw from these new estimates relates to
the impact of production changes. Whatever the model we consider, our results indicate
that production changes impact prices with a lag. The current production variation is never
signi￿cant while the ￿rst two lags as well as the remaining cumulated changes are always
signi￿cant. Firms would react with some delay to production changes while they react more
27promptly to cost changes. Two explanations can be given to this result. First, ￿rms might
prefer not to react immediately to production level changes before they have assessed their
durability. As the descriptive statistics provided in Section 2 indicate, the variability of the
production level is quite important. Moreover, changes in the production level may be more
idiosyncratic than cost shocks. Then, because of the uncertainty regarding their competitors
pricing decisions, ￿rms may be reluctant to change their price too often and/or too early.
Finally, a last noticeable point that can be outlined in this set of results relates to the
impact of the sectoral producer price index variations. Indeed, although slightly decreasing
over time, the time pro￿le of the price reaction to these sectoral price changes (considered by
￿rms as an indicator of the average reaction of their competitors) is essentially constant. In
other words, while estimating a more ￿ exible model than the usual state-dependent model
entails di⁄erent conclusions about the impact of costs and production level changes, the
two models we have estimated lead to broadly similar conclusion regarding the impact of
the sectoral in￿ ation on price changes. Thus, these results tend to con￿rm the approach
generally taken to study the impact of in￿ ation on price changes (e.g. see Cecchetti, 1986,
Lach and Tsiddon, 1992 and FougŁre et al., 2007, among others).
5.4 What about asymmetries?
Whether price adjustments in reaction to positive and negative shocks are symmetric is still
an open issue (e.g. see Peltzman, 2000, Ray et al., 2006, Levy et al., 2008, M￿ller and
Ray, 2007, Fabiani et al., 2006 and 2007, Loupias and Ricart, 2007). Indeed, the existing
literature does not come to a consensus on this question. The descriptive statistics provided
at the beginning of this paper (see Table 3) seemed to point to a rather limited degree of
asymmetry in the conditional probability of price changes following costs shocks. In order to
check the robustness of this statement, we have run a set of regressions in which we allow
prices to react di⁄erently whether the observed variation in cost or production is positive or
28negative. The results are provided in table 11 below.14
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE
These estimation results and the marginal e⁄ects provided in table 12 below lead to a
di⁄erent conclusion. Indeed, cost increases appear to be more rapidly and fully incorporated
in prices than cost decreases. In particular, the transmission of intermediate input price
increases to the product price is immediate and quite strong while this transmission is delayed
and of a much lower magnitude when the shock corresponds to a decrease. It is striking to
observe that, at the opposite, there is some more symmetry in the reaction of prices to wage
changes. Wage costs decreases are incorporated rather rapidly in price decreases, although
this is to a lesser degree as compared to the reaction of prices to wage increases. It might
be that wage decreases are associated with a labor management policy whereby ￿rms try
to gain in competitiveness, which would explain why, when wage costs are lowered, these
gains are, at least partly, incorporated in prices. This is another illustration of the argument
exposed at the beginning of this paper stating that intermediate inputs price changes are
"exogenous" to the ￿rms decisions but that wage costs are probably not. Our results also
point to a strong asymmetry in the way prices are adjusted to the sectoral price in￿ ation.
Firms adjust their prices upward but do not seem to do it downward so often. This is not
a surprise in an environment where, except for a few speci￿c industries, in￿ ation is positive.
The need to lower prices is less stringent than to increase them when costs rise. Finally,
it is also worth mentioning that the asymmetry we get regarding the reaction of prices to
production level changes is not that important. This result is not in accordance with the
survey results provided in Fabiani et al. (2006) and (2007) and deserves to be considered
again in future research to check for its robustness.
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE
14We just present the results associated with the treatment of endogeneity as suggested
by Rivers and Vuong (1988). Indeed, the estimates presented in the two previous sections
show that accounting for a possible unobserved heterogeneity does not a⁄ect the results.
296 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an empirical analysis of the impact, at the micro level, of changes in
the ￿rms￿environment (in terms of intermediate inputs prices, wages, demand and sectoral
prices) on their price decisions. We estimate an ordered probit model using a sample of
2,401 ￿rms from the French manufacturing sector that we observe monthly over at least
12 consecutive months between October 1998 and December 2005. Our results show that
changes in the price of intermediate inputs are the main driver of producer price changes.
Firms also appear to react signi￿cantly to changes in the producer price index of their
industry: relative prices matter. Variations in labor costs as well as in the production level
also appear to increase the likelihood of a price change but their in￿ uence seem to be of
lesser importance for explaining producer price variations. We also show that estimating
an unconstrained dynamic model allows to improve the estimation results as compared to
those associated with a standard state-dependent model. Finally, our results point to an
asymmetry in price adjustments. When they face cost variations, ￿rms appear to adjust
their prices upward more often and more rapidly than they do it downward.
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34APPENDIX - Full estimation results
Table A1: State-dependent model estimates
Coeff  Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat
cum_ii_price 0.041 17.82 0.127 29.36 0.144 28.48 0.181 29.06 0.195 27.06
cum_wage -0.003 -1.10 0.001 0.07 -0.001 -0.07 -0.015 -1.45 -0.010 -0.83
cum_prod 0.008 4.90 0.032 9.63 0.025 6.62 0.046 9.12 0.038 6.69
cum_sect_price 0.013 4.59 0.105 18.99 0.110 17.36 0.109 19.18 0.117 17.95
vat_2000 0.122 1.79 0.080 1.17 0.095 1.36 0.084 1.19 0.098 1.35
vat_2000_2 -0.051 -1.27 0.009 0.22 -0.001 -0.03 0.008 0.20 0.000 0.00
Euro_2002 0.042 0.85 0.043 0.85 0.047 0.91 0.037 0.71 0.038 0.71
Euro_2002_2 -0.101 -4.73 -0.018 -0.81 -0.020 -0.88 -0.005 -0.21 -0.009 -0.39
q1 -2.274 -95.92 -2.188 -83.52 -2.368 -65.48 -1.380 -57.72 -1.481 -42.48
q2 -1.451 -71.03 -1.362 -58.64 -1.467 -43.77
q3 1.232 61.35 1.356 58.53 1.429 42.79 1.341 56.30 1.425 41.09
q4 2.031 90.29 2.174 85.22 2.291 64.90
sect_c1 -0.032 -0.85 -0.086 -2.24 -0.103 -1.52 -0.086 -2.23 -0.110 -1.60
sect_c2 -0.243 -6.49 -0.199 -5.27 -0.213 -3.08 -0.227 -5.90 -0.246 -3.52
sect_c3 -0.057 -1.50 -0.279 -7.03 -0.271 -3.87 -0.279 -6.94 -0.291 -3.98
sect_c4 0.011 0.40 -0.078 -2.79 -0.078 -1.56 -0.107 -3.73 -0.105 -2.01
sect_d0 -0.148 -5.00 -0.243 -7.87 -0.294 -5.27 -0.250 -7.81 -0.318 -5.39
sect_e1 -0.189 -5.11 -0.262 -6.79 -0.335 -4.71 -0.272 -6.95 -0.360 -4.91
sect_e2 -0.019 -0.84 -0.125 -5.38 -0.132 -3.17 -0.141 -5.93 -0.148 -3.39
sect_e3 -0.135 -3.10 0.036 0.80 0.023 0.30 0.038 0.83 0.032 0.41
sect_f1 0.012 0.44 -0.101 -3.75 -0.082 -1.63 -0.154 -5.60 -0.148 -2.86
sect_f2 -0.171 -5.50 -0.206 -6.57 -0.209 -3.49 -0.254 -7.95 -0.244 -3.98
sect_f3 -0.123 -5.43 -0.104 -4.54 -0.084 -1.96 -0.122 -5.23 -0.095 -2.10
sect_f4 0.033 1.51 -0.056 -2.49 -0.066 -1.63 -0.073 -3.18 -0.074 -1.75
sect_f5 0.078 3.61 -0.047 -2.14 -0.056 -1.37 -0.061 -2.67 -0.066 -1.58
sect_f6 -0.292 -6.09 -0.344 -7.10 -0.357 -4.68 -0.378 -7.66 -0.381 -4.86
year_1999 0.027 0.74 0.078 2.06 0.075 1.81 0.093 2.40 0.098 2.30
year_2000 0.221 8.14 0.143 5.08 0.156 4.96 0.131 4.59 0.150 4.65
year_2001 -0.008 -0.34 0.011 0.45 0.018 0.67 -0.002 -0.08 0.003 0.11
year_2002 -0.105 -4.66 -0.027 -1.18 -0.013 -0.52 -0.022 -0.93 -0.011 -0.43
year_2003 -0.203 -10.67 -0.106 -5.43 -0.095 -4.45 -0.097 -4.89 -0.090 -4.11
year_2004 0.042 2.29 0.037 1.97 0.043 2.19 0.043 2.26 0.052 2.58
y_0 0.032 1.95 0.048 2.16
1st stage residuals
cum_ii_price -0.114 -22.60 -0.106 -18.87 -0.161 -22.20 -0.142 -17.50
cum_wage 0.012 1.51 0.009 1.07 0.028 2.55 0.011 0.92
cum_prod -0.028 -7.38 -0.018 -4.37 -0.042 -7.13 -0.029 -4.49
cum_sect_price -0.119 -18.44 -0.117 -16.40 -0.126 -18.85 -0.126 -16.99
rho=su/(su+sw) 0.128 22.56 0.135 22.17
LogL
Number of obs.
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes
51,067








endogenous var. unobs. Heterog. endogenous var. unobs. Heterog.
-35,013 -34,074 -30,351 -29,412
51,067
Rivers-Vuong and




sect_c1 Clothing and leather goods
sect_c2 Publishing and printing
sect_c3 Pharmaceuticals, perfumes and cleaning products
sect_c4 Household equipment
sect_d0 Automotive industry
sect_e1 Shipbuilding, aircraft and rail construction
sect_e2 Mechanical equipment
sect_e3 Electrical and electronic equipment
sect_f1 Mineral products
sect_f2 Textiles
sect_f3 Wood and paper
sect_f4 Chemicals, rubber and plastics
sect_f5 Metalwork and fabricated metal products
sect_f6 Electrical and electronic components
and with rho=su/(su+sw) the share of the firm specific effect variance in the total variance.
sect_b0 is the reference sector in all regressions below.
36Table A2: Estimates of a flexible dynamic model
Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat
ii_price 0.434 49.52 1.100 5.07 1.188 5.32 1.623 5.72 1.737 5.92
ii_price(-1) -0.069 -5.75 -0.266 -2.51 -0.265 -2.43 -0.361 -2.86 -0.361 -2.77
ii_price(-2) -0.011 -0.80 -0.056 -1.51 -0.042 -1.10 -0.105 -2.07 -0.092 -1.77
ii_price(-3) 0.020 1.34 0.051 1.80 0.071 2.44 0.060 1.64 0.078 2.06
remain_cum_iip -0.010 -2.79 0.022 1.15 0.043 2.18 0.049 2.05 0.067 2.65
wage 0.024 3.28 0.170 7.05 0.181 7.31 0.213 5.38 0.231 5.63
wage(-1) 0.000 -0.04 0.012 1.08 0.011 1.00 0.001 0.05 0.005 0.25
wage(-2) 0.009 1.01 0.018 1.47 0.018 1.41 -0.007 -0.34 -0.002 -0.10
wage(-3) -0.004 -0.41 0.005 0.36 0.004 0.33 -0.054 -2.24 -0.051 -2.01
remain_cum_wage 0.009 2.71 0.046 3.59 0.048 3.53 0.004 0.22 0.015 0.79
prod 0.043 9.32 0.039 0.91 0.035 0.80 0.037 0.55 0.039 0.57
prod(-1) 0.006 1.05 0.019 2.41 0.014 1.78 0.025 2.31 0.021 1.83
prod(-2) 0.002 0.30 0.021 2.88 0.016 2.11 0.042 3.60 0.037 3.06
prod(-3) -0.009 -1.51 -0.002 -0.26 -0.009 -1.06 -0.010 -0.73 -0.019 -1.32
remain_cum_prod 0.007 3.06 0.039 6.46 0.033 5.00 0.058 6.14 0.052 5.02
sect_price 0.238 18.11 0.148 10.58 0.163 11.20 0.160 11.18 0.179 11.92
sect_price(-1) 0.022 1.36 0.107 4.66 0.118 4.98 0.103 4.39 0.115 4.76
sect_price(-2) 0.003 0.14 0.102 4.29 0.110 4.46 0.112 4.59 0.124 4.88
sect_price(-3) -0.011 -0.55 0.103 3.73 0.114 3.98 0.112 3.96 0.126 4.29
remain_cum_price -0.006 -1.52 0.055 4.46 0.055 4.17 0.059 4.63 0.063 4.59
vat_2000 0.087 1.26 0.069 0.96 0.078 1.07 0.082 1.11 0.092 1.21
vat_2000_2 -0.141 -3.45 -0.134 -3.01 -0.152 -3.30 -0.131 -2.91 -0.145 -3.09
Euro_2002 0.064 1.24 0.041 0.64 0.047 0.71 0.062 0.97 0.066 1.01
Euro_2002_2 -0.073 -3.35 -0.020 -0.89 -0.017 -0.72 -0.008 -0.33 -0.005 -0.22
q1 -2.315 -95.64 -2.194 -76.48 -2.373 -62.19 -1.389 -53.03 -1.480 -40.47
q2 -1.473 -70.60 -1.348 -52.22 -1.447 -40.79 1.427 54.49 1.535 41.99
q3 1.308 63.61 1.460 56.40 1.551 43.70
q4 2.174 92.91 2.349 82.35 2.487 65.87
sect_c1 -0.031 -0.81 -0.103 -2.52 -0.125 -1.80 -0.072 -1.76 -0.097 -1.37
sect_c2 -0.264 -6.94 -0.239 -6.19 -0.253 -3.53 -0.249 -6.31 -0.267 -3.64
sect_c3 -0.054 -1.40 -0.233 -5.34 -0.230 -3.18 -0.216 -4.80 -0.232 -3.10
sect_c4 0.010 0.34 -0.080 -2.71 -0.087 -1.68 -0.111 -3.63 -0.107 -1.94
sect_d0 -0.169 -5.60 -0.303 -9.16 -0.370 -6.49 -0.293 -8.45 -0.367 -6.02
sect_e1 -0.184 -4.88 -0.289 -7.02 -0.364 -5.03 -0.248 -5.82 -0.337 -4.46
sect_e2 -0.058 -2.54 -0.201 -7.24 -0.214 -4.76 -0.202 -7.34 -0.220 -4.79
sect_e3 -0.073 -1.66 0.012 0.24 -0.002 -0.03 0.056 1.15 0.057 0.72
sect_f1 -0.015 -0.56 -0.102 -3.57 -0.096 -1.83 -0.157 -5.32 -0.161 -2.99
sect_f2 -0.156 -4.95 -0.186 -5.73 -0.183 -2.93 -0.215 -6.46 -0.200 -3.17
sect_f3 -0.137 -6.01 -0.141 -5.80 -0.131 -2.90 -0.149 -6.16 -0.122 -2.66
sect_f4 -0.006 -0.25 -0.124 -4.49 -0.149 -3.33 -0.133 -4.90 -0.148 -3.29
sect_f5 -0.008 -0.37 -0.143 -4.69 -0.165 -3.63 -0.156 -5.30 -0.173 -3.81
sect_f6 -0.298 -6.11 -0.346 -7.03 -0.367 -4.78 -0.388 -7.71 -0.397 -5.02
year_1999 -0.057 -1.52 -0.045 -0.86 -0.049 -0.88 -0.086 -1.53 -0.082 -1.38
year_2000 0.134 4.80 0.046 1.16 0.057 1.33 -0.012 -0.27 0.000 0.01
year_2001 0.061 2.52 0.134 4.48 0.159 4.87 0.126 4.10 0.150 4.47
year_2002 -0.108 -4.70 -0.033 -1.35 -0.008 -0.31 -0.026 -1.05 -0.005 -0.17
year_2003 -0.184 -9.47 -0.112 -5.50 -0.090 -4.04 -0.096 -4.61 -0.077 -3.36
year_2004 -0.051 -2.67 -0.141 -3.51 -0.146 -3.50 -0.137 -3.58 -0.140 -3.52
method for Wooldridge for method for Wooldridge for
endog. var. unobs. heterog. endog. var. unobs. heterog.
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
Simple Probit Rivers-Vuong Rivers-Vuong and Rivers-Vuong Rivers-Vuong and
37Table A2 (cont.): Estimates of a flexible dynamic model
Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat
y_0 0.043 2.64 0.060 2.72
1st stage residuals
ii_price -0.708 -3.26 -0.753 -3.37 -1.101 -3.88 -1.162 -3.96
ii_price(-1) 0.061 0.57 0.071 0.65 0.066 0.51 0.083 0.62
ii_price(-2) 0.019 0.47 0.019 0.45 0.014 0.24 0.019 0.33
ii_price(-3) -0.063 -1.94 -0.068 -2.03 -0.099 -2.28 -0.099 -2.20
remain_cum_iip -0.037 -1.92 -0.045 -2.27 -0.061 -2.48 -0.063 -2.45
wage -0.157 -6.21 -0.170 -6.52 -0.227 -5.37 -0.244 -5.57
wage(-1) 0.008 0.44 0.006 0.32 0.044 1.26 0.016 0.45
wage(-2) 0.032 1.70 0.024 1.22 0.150 4.45 0.112 3.19
wage(-3) 0.027 1.43 0.017 0.84 0.149 4.32 0.117 3.25
remain_cum_wage -0.029 -2.21 -0.034 -2.45 0.015 0.84 -0.003 -0.15
prod 0.003 0.07 0.005 0.11 0.022 0.32 0.018 0.25
prod(-1) -0.068 -5.33 -0.052 -3.93 -0.094 -4.67 -0.076 -3.60
prod(-2) -0.065 -5.55 -0.050 -4.10 -0.113 -5.98 -0.096 -4.88
prod(-3) -0.021 -1.77 -0.006 -0.52 -0.030 -1.53 -0.011 -0.54
remain_cum_prod -0.036 -5.58 -0.028 -4.00 -0.054 -5.29 -0.042 -3.85
sect_price(-1) -0.240 -6.90 -0.240 -6.71 -0.257 -7.05 -0.258 -6.84
sect_price(-2) -0.175 -4.99 -0.173 -4.81 -0.198 -5.40 -0.198 -5.24
sect_price(-3) -0.185 -4.97 -0.203 -5.27 -0.218 -5.66 -0.239 -5.96
remain_cum_price -0.061 -4.70 -0.055 -3.98 -0.067 -5.00 -0.063 -4.42
rho=su/(su+sw) 0.128 22.76 0.134 22.29
LogL
Rivers-Vuong Rivers-Vuong and
endog. var. unobs. heterog. endog. var. unobs. heterog.
method for Wooldridge for method for Wooldridge for
-29,022
Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
Simple Probit




38Table A3: Estimates of a model with asymmetries
Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat
ii_price -0.355 -0.74 1.370 5.87 0.282 0.38 1.530 4.33
ii_price(-1) 0.232 1.17 -0.271 -2.29 0.091 0.34 -0.225 -1.46
ii_price(-2) 0.041 0.55 -0.046 -0.66 -0.001 -0.01 -0.025 -0.26
ii_price(-3) 0.068 0.85 0.085 1.19 0.014 0.12 0.135 1.45
remain_cum_iip 0.132 1.95 0.022 0.35 0.182 1.39 0.030 0.33
wage 0.988 1.54 0.210 6.21 2.432 2.66 0.400 4.30
wage(-1) -0.067 -2.30 0.034 2.90 -0.054 -1.07 0.006 0.23
wage(-2) -0.027 -0.83 0.040 2.46 -0.071 -1.20 0.052 1.46
wage(-3) -0.027 -0.62 0.035 1.17 -0.066 -1.00 0.039 0.76
remain_cum_wage -0.016 -0.39 0.054 2.75 -0.240 -1.87 0.017 0.71
prod 0.298 2.42 -0.223 -2.00 0.193 1.02 -0.116 -0.49
prod(-1) -0.050 -1.50 0.065 3.24 -0.015 -0.28 0.070 2.00
prod(-2) -0.005 -0.25 0.047 2.91 0.018 0.54 0.071 2.56
prod(-3) -0.031 -1.25 0.027 1.33 -0.009 -0.27 0.022 0.66
remain_cum_prod -0.100 -1.40 0.119 3.14 -0.061 -0.58 0.119 2.12
sect_price 0.039 1.37 0.204 10.08 0.047 1.61 0.223 10.54
sect_price(-1) 0.100 2.42 0.077 1.66 0.070 1.63 0.161 3.20
sect_price(-2) -0.037 -0.77 0.221 5.15 -0.003 -0.07 0.226 5.07
sect_price(-3) 0.025 0.35 0.167 2.59 0.058 0.90 0.158 2.47
remain_cum_price 0.019 1.01 0.058 1.88 0.004 0.21 0.096 2.85
vat_2000 0.028 0.36 0.196 1.94
vat_2000_2 -0.122 -2.43 -0.090 -1.81
Euro_2002 0.081 1.16 0.068 1.05
Euro_2002_2 -0.058 -2.09 -0.007 -0.23
q1 -1.971 -21.72 -1.142 -11.89
q2 -1.117 -12.46
q3 1.697 18.89 1.679 17.45
q4 2.585 28.46
sect_c1 -0.140 -1.43 -0.132 -1.55
sect_c2 -0.077 -1.23 -0.151 -2.19
sect_c3 -0.226 -2.13 -0.250 -2.53
sect_c4 0.015 0.26 -0.041 -0.75
sect_d0 -0.248 -3.83 -0.237 -3.97
sect_e1 -0.221 -2.67 -0.173 -2.50
sect_e2 -0.095 -1.82 -0.085 -1.70
sect_e3 -0.085 -1.02 -0.049 -0.66
sect_f1 0.020 0.33 -0.081 -1.28
sect_f2 -0.188 -2.96 -0.185 -3.38
sect_f3 -0.070 -2.02 -0.109 -3.24
sect_f4 -0.075 -2.10 -0.070 -2.03
sect_f5 -0.098 -2.37 -0.122 -3.13
sect_f6 -0.241 -4.06 -0.275 -4.19
year_1999 0.029 0.29 0.049 0.49
year_2000 0.077 1.34 0.056 1.02
year_2001 0.121 2.76 0.122 2.79
year_2002 -0.007 -0.18 -0.001 -0.04
year_2003 -0.115 -3.27 -0.075 -1.96
year_2004 -0.184 -4.41 -0.114 -2.53
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
Effect of a Effect of an Effect of a Effect of an
decrease in x increase in x decrease in x increase in x
39Table A3 (cont.): Estimates of a model with asymmetries
Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat
1st stage residuals
ii_price -0.993 -4.25 0.778 1.61 -1.037 -2.93 0.291 0.39
ii_price(-1) 0.101 0.84 -0.537 -2.67 -0.007 -0.05 -0.527 -1.92
ii_price(-2) -0.004 -0.06 -0.071 -0.87 -0.105 -1.05 -0.045 -0.35
ii_price(-3) -0.127 -1.71 -0.043 -0.50 -0.219 -2.23 0.000 0.00
remain_cum_iip -0.031 -0.49 -0.153 -2.26 -0.034 -0.37 -0.207 -1.58
wage -0.190 -5.47 -1.020 -1.59 -0.403 -4.25 -2.473 -2.70
wage(-1) -0.044 -2.12 0.123 1.81 -0.043 -0.97 0.194 1.93
wage(-2) -0.018 -0.82 0.096 1.65 0.043 0.90 0.134 1.39
wage(-3) -0.021 -0.63 0.016 0.25 0.013 0.22 0.150 1.57
remain_cum_wage -0.046 -2.30 0.018 0.40 -0.010 -0.39 0.223 1.67
prod 0.283 2.52 -0.275 -2.23 0.195 0.83 -0.154 -0.82
prod(-1) -0.085 -3.28 -0.044 -1.15 -0.077 -1.70 -0.138 -2.25
prod(-2) -0.064 -2.90 -0.074 -2.84 -0.104 -2.74 -0.140 -3.28
prod(-3) -0.004 -0.17 -0.046 -1.56 0.010 0.25 -0.113 -2.56
remain_cum_prod -0.112 -2.95 0.087 1.22 -0.109 -1.94 0.047 0.45
sect_price(-1) -0.256 -4.47 -0.162 -2.20 -0.377 -6.06 -0.086 -1.12
sect_price(-2) -0.293 -5.36 -0.044 -0.60 -0.316 -5.47 -0.067 -0.88
sect_price(-3) -0.279 -3.83 -0.046 -0.52 -0.290 -3.94 -0.101 -1.19
remain_cum_price -0.065 -2.08 -0.023 -1.15 -0.106 -3.07 -0.008 -0.39
LogL
Note: The estimates presented in this table are those obtained using Rivers-Vuong approach.
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
-33,543 -28,954
decrease in x increase in x decrease in x increase in x
Effect of a Effect of an Effect of a Effect of an
40TABLES
Table 1: Changes in the environment and price changes
Change in No change in Total
the environment the environment
Price change 16.6% 2.4% 19%
No price change 60.9% 20.1% 81%
Total 77.4% 22.6% 100%
Source: Banque de France business surveys merged with the
ACEMO survey.
The dataset contains 51,067 observations about 2,401 firms and the
sample period is October 1998 to December 2005.
Table 2: Probability of a price change, conditional on cost variations
Probability Price change
of occurrence conditional on
cost variations
Change in input prices and wages 6.1% 39.7%
Change in input prices only 20.1% 36.7%
Change in wages only 16.0% 13.9%
No change in input prices nor wages 57.8% 12.1%
Total 100% 19.0%
Source: Banque de France business surveys merged with the ACEMO
survey.
The dataset contains 51,067 observations about 2,401 firms and the
sample period is October 1998 to December 2005.
41Table 3: Probability of price increases/decreases, conditional on cost variations
Probability Price decrease Price increase
of occurrence conditional on conditional on
changes in t changes in t
Decrease in both input price and wage 0.2% 27.0% 10.0%
Increase in both input price and wage 3.6% 9.5% 31.1%
Decrease in input price (wage stable or increased) 7.7% 28.4% 7.8%
Increase in input price (wage stable or decreased) 14.6% 8.0% 29.2%
No change in input price (wage stable or decreased) 59.9% 6.3% 5.7%
No change in input price and wage increased 14.0% 6.5% 7.8%
Source: Banque de France business surveys merged with the ACEMO survey.
The dataset contains 51,067 observations about 2,401 firms and the sample period is October 1998
to December 2005.
Table 4: Probability of a price change, conditional on production and cost changes
Probability Price change
of occurrence conditional on
changes in t
Change in both costs and production 27.4% 30.1%
Change in costs only 14.8% 25.4%
Change in production only 35.3% 12.9%
No change in costs nor production 22.5% 10.8%
Total 100% 19.0%
Source: Banque de France business surveys merged with the ACEMO survey.
The dataset contains 51,067 observations about 2,401 firms and the sample
period is October 1998 to December 2005.
42    .
Business surveys Econometric
Industry   full database   sample
DA. - Food products, beverages and tobacco 16.7% 16.6%
DB. - Textiles and textile products 6.8% 4.0%
DC. - Leather and leather products 1.7% 1.7%
DD - Wood and wood products 3.7% 2.9%
DE - Pulp, paper and paper products 8.2% 8.8%
DF - Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel           -       -
DG - Chemicals, chemical products 7.4% 7.4%
DH - Rubber and plastic products 5.7% 6.5%
DI - Other non-metallic mineral products 4.8% 5.4%
DJ - Basic metals and fabricated metal products 16.2% 16.6%
DK- Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 9.4% 9.0%
DL - Electrical and optical equipment 9.0% 7.8%
DM - Transport equipment 5.8% 8.2%
DN. - Manufacturing n.e.c 4.6% 5.1%
Number of firms 4,032 1,006
Source: Banque de France business surveys merged with the ACEMO survey
conducted by the French Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The dataset contains
51,057 ovservations from 2,401 firms observed monthly between October 1998 and
December 2005.
Table 5: Sectoral breakdown of the initial database and of the econometric
sample as of January 2005.
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Price changes 18.6% 19.0%
      of which increases 10.9% 10.5%
      of which decreases 7.7% 8.5%
Intermediate input price changes 24.1% 26.2%
      of which increases 17.0% 18.2%
      of which decreases 7.1% 8.0%
Wage changes(14) 18.1% 22.1%
      of which increases 14.7% 19.3%
      of which decreases 3.4% 2.8%
Production level changes 62.1% 62.7%
      of which increases 36.1% 34.8%
      of which decreases 26.0% 27.9%
Number of observations
Table 6: Frequency of price, costs and production level changes
/increases /decreases in the initial database and in the econometric
sample.
(14) The initial database considered here for wage changes is extracted from
the ACEMO survey database; it includes about 600,000 observations about






44Table 7: State-dependent model estimates
Coeff  Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat
cum_ii_price 0.041 17.82 0.127 29.36 0.144 28.48 0.181 29.06 0.195 27.06
cum_wage -0.003 -1.10 0.001 0.07 -0.001 -0.07 -0.015 -1.45 -0.010 -0.83
cum_prod 0.008 4.90 0.032 9.63 0.025 6.62 0.046 9.12 0.038 6.69
cum_sect_price 0.013 4.59 0.105 18.99 0.110 17.36 0.109 19.18 0.117 17.95
vat_2000 0.122 1.79 0.080 1.17 0.095 1.36 0.084 1.19 0.098 1.35
vat_2000_2 -0.051 -1.27 0.009 0.22 -0.001 -0.03 0.008 0.20 0.000 0.00
Euro_2002 0.042 0.85 0.043 0.85 0.047 0.91 0.037 0.71 0.038 0.71
Euro_2002_2 -0.101 -4.73 -0.018 -0.81 -0.020 -0.88 -0.005 -0.21 -0.009 -0.39
q1 -2.274 -95.92 -2.188 -83.52 -2.368 -65.48 -1.380 -57.72 -1.481 -42.48
q2 -1.451 -71.03 -1.362 -58.64 -1.467 -43.77
q3 1.232 61.35 1.356 58.53 1.429 42.79 1.341 56.30 1.425 41.09
q4 2.031 90.29 2.174 85.22 2.291 64.9
rho=su/(su+sw) 0.128 22.56 0.135 22.17
LogL
Number of obs.
Note: All the estimated models include industry specific and year dummies. The last two models also include
estimated first-step residuals to tackle the endogeneity of the state-dependent regressors "à la Rivers-Vuong"; see








endogenous var. unobs. Heterog.
51,067
35,482
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes
Simple Probit
Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
Rivers-Vuong Rivers-Vuong and Rivers-Vuong and Rivers-Vuong
endogenous var. unobs. Heterog.
-30,351 -29,412
Wooldridge for method for
51,067
Table 8: Marginal effects / State-dependent model
margin. effect Z-stat margin. effect Z-stat margin. effect Z-stat margin. effect Z-stat
cum_ii_price -0.79% -27.78 0.90% 27.86 -1.20% -28.41 1.41% 28.78
cum_wage -0.01% -0.07 0.01% 0.07 0.25% 1.45 -0.30% -1.45
cum_prod -0.33% -9.57 0.37% 9.58 -0.41% -9.11 0.49% 9.11
cum_sect_price -0.69% -18.53 0.79% 18.57 -0.92% -18.98 1.09% 19.08
Note: The marginal effects are giving the probability change associated with a 1% change in the X variables. They
have been computed using the Rivers-Voung estimates.
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
Probability of a Probability of an
small decrease
observ. prob. = 7.00% observ. prob. = 8.42% observ. prob. = 8.44% observ. prob. = 10.54%
Probability of a Probability of a
increase small increase decrease
45Table 9: Estimates of a flexible dynamic model
Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat
ii_price 0.434 49.52 1.100 5.07 1.188 5.32 1.623 5.72 1.737 5.92
ii_price(-1) -0.069 -5.75 -0.266 -2.51 -0.265 -2.43 -0.361 -2.86 -0.361 -2.77
ii_price(-2) -0.011 -0.80 -0.056 -1.51 -0.042 -1.10 -0.105 -2.07 -0.092 -1.77
ii_price(-3) 0.020 1.34 0.051 1.80 0.071 2.44 0.060 1.64 0.078 2.06
remain_cum_iip -0.010 -2.79 0.022 1.15 0.043 2.18 0.049 2.05 0.067 2.65
wage 0.024 3.28 0.170 7.05 0.181 7.31 0.213 5.38 0.231 5.63
wage(-1) 0.000 -0.04 0.012 1.08 0.011 1.00 0.001 0.05 0.005 0.25
wage(-2) 0.009 1.01 0.018 1.47 0.018 1.41 -0.007 -0.34 -0.002 -0.10
wage(-3) -0.004 -0.41 0.005 0.36 0.004 0.33 -0.054 -2.24 -0.051 -2.01
remain_cum_wage 0.009 2.71 0.046 3.59 0.048 3.53 0.004 0.22 0.015 0.79
prod 0.043 9.32 0.039 0.91 0.035 0.80 0.037 0.55 0.039 0.57
prod(-1) 0.006 1.05 0.019 2.41 0.014 1.78 0.025 2.31 0.021 1.83
prod(-2) 0.002 0.30 0.021 2.88 0.016 2.11 0.042 3.60 0.037 3.06
prod(-3) -0.009 -1.51 -0.002 -0.26 -0.009 -1.06 -0.010 -0.73 -0.019 -1.32
remain_cum_prod 0.007 3.06 0.039 6.46 0.033 5.00 0.058 6.14 0.052 5.02
sect_price 0.238 18.11 0.148 10.58 0.163 11.20 0.160 11.18 0.179 11.92
sect_price(-1) 0.022 1.36 0.107 4.66 0.118 4.98 0.103 4.39 0.115 4.76
sect_price(-2) 0.003 0.14 0.102 4.29 0.110 4.46 0.112 4.59 0.124 4.88
sect_price(-3) -0.011 -0.55 0.103 3.73 0.114 3.98 0.112 3.96 0.126 4.29
remain_cum_price -0.006 -1.52 0.055 4.46 0.055 4.17 0.059 4.63 0.063 4.59
vat_2000 0.087 1.26 0.069 0.96 0.078 1.07 0.082 1.11 0.092 1.21
vat_2000_2 -0.141 -3.45 -0.134 -3.01 -0.152 -3.30 -0.131 -2.91 -0.145 -3.09
Euro_2002 0.064 1.24 0.041 0.64 0.047 0.71 0.062 0.97 0.066 1.01
Euro_2002_2 -0.073 -3.35 -0.020 -0.89 -0.017 -0.72 -0.008 -0.33 -0.005 -0.22
q1 -2.315 -95.64 -2.194 -76.48 -2.373 -62.19 -1.389 -53.03 -1.480 -40.47
q2 -1.473 -70.60 -1.348 -52.22 -1.447 -40.79 1.427 54.49 1.535 41.99
q3 1.308 63.61 1.460 56.40 1.551 43.70
q4 2.174 92.91 2.349 82.35 2.487 65.87
rho=su/(su+sw) 0.128 22.76 0.134 22.29
LogL
Note: All the estimated models include industry specific and year dummies. The last two models also include estimated
first-step residuals  to tackle the endogeneity of the state-dependent regressors "à la Rivers-Vuong"; see the appendix for
complete results.
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
Simple Probit Rivers-Vuong Rivers-Vuong and Rivers-Vuong Rivers-Vuong and
-28,086
endog. var. unobs. heterog. endog. var. unobs. heterog.
method for Wooldridge for method for Wooldridge for
-34,068 -33,632 -32,676 -29,022
46Table 10: Marginal effects / Flexible state-dependent model
marg. effect Z-stat marg. effect Z-stat marg. effect Z-stat marg. effect Z-stat
ii_price -1.62% -5.06 1.90% 5.06 -2.27% -5.71 2.67% 5.72
ii_price(-1) 0.22% 2.51 -0.26% -2.51 0.30% 2.86 -0.36% -2.86
ii_price(-2) 0.04% 1.51 -0.04% -1.51 0.07% 2.07 -0.08% -2.07
ii_price(-3) -0.03% -1.8 0.03% 1.8 -0.03% -1.64 0.04% 1.64
remain_cum_iip -0.05% -1.15 0.06% 1.15 -0.14% -2.04 0.16% 2.04
total effect -1.44% 1.69% -2.07% 2.43%
wage -0.41% -7.03 0.48% 7.03 -0.48% -5.37 0.57% 5.38
wage(-1) -0.02% -1.08 0.02% 1.08 0.00% -0.05 0.00% 0.05
wage(-2) -0.03% -1.47 0.03% 1.47 0.01% 0.34 -0.01% -0.34
wage(-3) -0.01% -0.36 0.01% 0.36 0.07% 2.24 -0.08% -2.24
remain_cum_wage -0.45% -3.59 0.53% 3.59 -0.04% -0.22 0.04% 0.22
total effect -0.91% 1.08% -0.44% 0.52%
prod -0.04% -0.91 0.05% 0.91 -0.03% -0.55 0.04% 0.55
prod(-1) -0.02% -2.41 0.02% 2.41 -0.02% -2.31 0.02% 2.31
prod(-2) -0.02% -2.88 0.02% 2.88 -0.03% -3.6 0.03% 3.59
prod(-3) 0.00% 0.26 0.00% -0.26 0.01% 0.73 -0.01% -0.73
remain_cum_prod -0.25% -6.44 0.29% 6.44 -0.31% -6.14 0.37% 6.14
total effect -0.32% 0.38% -0.39% 0.46%
sect_price -0.17% -10.49 0.20% 10.5 -0.23% -11.13 0.27% 11.15
sect_price(-1) -0.08% -4.65 0.10% 4.65 -0.10% -4.39 0.12% 4.39
sect_price(-2) -0.06% -4.28 0.07% 4.28 -0.08% -4.58 0.10% 4.58
sect_price(-3) -0.05% -3.73 0.06% 3.73 -0.07% -3.96 0.08% 3.96
remain_cum_price -0.18% -4.45 0.22% 4.45 -0.25% -4.63 0.29% 4.63
total effect -0.55% 0.64% -0.72% 0.85%
Note: The marginal effects are giving the probability change associated with a 1% change in the X variables.  They
have been computed using the Rivers-Voung estimates.
observ. prob. = 7.00%
Probability of a
small increase
observ. prob. = 8.42% observ. prob. = 8.44% observ. prob. = 10.54%







47Table 11: Estimates of a model with asymmetries
Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat
ii_price -0.355 -0.74 1.370 5.87 0.282 0.38 1.530 4.33
ii_price(-1) 0.232 1.17 -0.271 -2.29 0.091 0.34 -0.225 -1.46
ii_price(-2) 0.041 0.55 -0.046 -0.66 -0.001 -0.01 -0.025 -0.26
ii_price(-3) 0.068 0.85 0.085 1.19 0.014 0.12 0.135 1.45
remain_cum_iip 0.132 1.95 0.022 0.35 0.182 1.39 0.030 0.33
wage 0.988 1.54 0.210 6.21 2.432 2.66 0.400 4.30
wage(-1) -0.067 -2.30 0.034 2.90 -0.054 -1.07 0.006 0.23
wage(-2) -0.027 -0.83 0.040 2.46 -0.071 -1.20 0.052 1.46
wage(-3) -0.027 -0.62 0.035 1.17 -0.066 -1.00 0.039 0.76
remain_cum_wage -0.016 -0.39 0.054 2.75 -0.240 -1.87 0.017 0.71
prod 0.298 2.42 -0.223 -2.00 0.193 1.02 -0.116 -0.49
prod(-1) -0.050 -1.50 0.065 3.24 -0.015 -0.28 0.070 2.00
prod(-2) -0.005 -0.25 0.047 2.91 0.018 0.54 0.071 2.56
prod(-3) -0.031 -1.25 0.027 1.33 -0.009 -0.27 0.022 0.66
remain_cum_prod -0.100 -1.40 0.119 3.14 -0.061 -0.58 0.119 2.12
sect_price 0.039 1.37 0.204 10.08 0.047 1.61 0.223 10.54
sect_price(-1) 0.100 2.42 0.077 1.66 0.070 1.63 0.161 3.20
sect_price(-2) -0.037 -0.77 0.221 5.15 -0.003 -0.07 0.226 5.07
sect_price(-3) 0.025 0.35 0.167 2.59 0.058 0.90 0.158 2.47
remain_cum_price 0.019 1.01 0.058 1.88 0.004 0.21 0.096 2.85
q1 -1.971 -21.72 -1.142 -11.89
q2 -1.117 -12.46
q3 1.697 18.89 1.679 17.45
q4 2.585 28.46
LogL
Note: The estimates presented in this table are those obtained using Rivers-Vuong approach.
-33,543 -28,954
decrease in x increase in x decrease in x increase in x
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
Effect of a Effect of an Effect of a Effect of an
48Table 12: Marginal effects in a model with asymmetries
marg. eff. Z-stat marg. eff. Z-stat marg. eff. Z-stat marg. eff. Z-stat
ii_price -0.38% -0.74 4.09% 5.86 0.30% 0.38 4.46% 4.33
ii_price(-1) 0.16% 1.17 -0.48% -2.29 0.06% 0.34 -0.40% -1.46
ii_price(-2) 0.02% 0.55 -0.07% -0.66 0.00% -0.01 -0.04% -0.26
ii_price(-3) 0.03% 0.85 0.10% 1.19 0.01% 0.12 0.16% 1.45
remain_cum_iip 0.27% 1.95 0.12% 0.35 0.36% 1.39 0.17% 0.33
total effect 0.11% 3.76% 0.73% 4.36%
wage 0.20% 1.54 0.64% 6.20 0.90% 2.66 1.24% 4.30
wage(-1) -0.01% -2.30 0.08% 2.90 -0.02% -1.07 0.01% 0.23
wage(-2) 0.00% -0.83 0.08% 2.46 -0.02% -1.20 0.10% 1.46
wage(-3) 0.00% -0.62 0.06% 1.17 -0.02% -1.00 0.07% 0.76
remain_cum_wage -0.01% -0.39 0.64% 2.75 -0.09% -1.87 0.20% 0.71
total effect 0.17% 1.50% 0.77% 1.63%
prod 1.36% 2.42 -1.50% -2.00 0.73% 1.02 -0.65% -0.49
prod(-1) -0.18% -1.50 0.34% 3.24 -0.05% -0.28 0.31% 2.00
prod(-2) -0.02% -0.25 0.21% 2.91 0.04% 0.54 0.27% 2.56
prod(-3) -0.08% -1.25 0.11% 1.33 -0.02% -0.27 0.07% 0.66
remain_cum_prod -0.41% -1.40 1.46% 3.14 -0.20% -0.58 1.21% 2.12
total effect 0.67% 0.62% 0.50% 1.21%
sect_price 0.04% 1.37 0.54% 10.01 0.06% 1.61 0.74% 10.52
sect_price(-1) 0.09% 2.41 0.15% 1.66 0.08% 1.63 0.39% 3.20
sect_price(-2) -0.03% -0.77 0.35% 5.14 0.00% -0.07 0.44% 5.06
sect_price(-3) 0.02% 0.35 0.23% 2.59 0.05% 0.90 0.27% 2.47
remain_cum_price 0.03% 1.01 0.33% 1.88 0.01% 0.21 0.69% 2.85
total effect 0.15% 1.60% 0.19% 2.53%
on the prob. of a on the prob. of a on the prob. of a on the prob. of a
price decrease price increase
price decrease price increase small small
obs. prob. = 8.42% obs. prob. = 8.42% obs. prob. = 10.54% obs. prob. = 10.54%
decrease in x increase in x decrease in x increase in x
Ordered probit with 5 outcomes Ordered probit with 3 outcomes
Effect of a Effect of an Effect of a Effect of an
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